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Abstract
Recent decades have witnessed major changes in the market for European soc-
cer. The most profound were the Bosman ruling, which lifted restrictions in the
European labor market for soccer talent, and the introduction of the Champi-
ons’ League, a high-proﬁle international competition that generates high rev-
enues for participating clubs. This paper studies the eﬀects of these changes
on the closeness of national and international competitions, from both a the-
oretical and an empirical perspective. We show that competitive balance in
national competitions has not been aﬀected. International quality diﬀerences
did increase, mainly as a result of the Bosman ruling.
1 Introduction
A 21st-century society without sports industries is unimaginable. Sports of all
types have permeated modern societies. Amateur sporting clubs are all over
the place, as are professional leagues of many diﬀerent sorts. Clearly, the eco-
nomic value of sports industries is not restricted to only sporting activities.
After all, sporting activities generate much economic value in related indus-
tries, varying from publishing and media to health and retailing industries.
The European Commission has estimated that trade in sports related activities
now constitutes 3% of world trade (Szymanski (2001a)). Additionally, sports
industries contribute indirectly to societal welfare by enhancing the popula-
tion’s health, by oﬀering ‘free’ entertainment and by fostering national pride.
This paper focuses on the analysis of the most popular sports of all: soccer,
or ‘non-American’ football. Soccer’s world championships for national teams
are the second-biggest sporting events in the world, immediately following the
Olympic Games. National leagues, professionally and non-professionally, ﬂour-
ish all over the globe, particularly in Europe and Latin America. Continents
organize annual international leagues in which the nationally top-performing
teams play for huge sums of prize, sponsor and television money.
The ‘professionalization’ of European soccer is unstoppable: rumours about
the establishment of a competing European league, next to UEFA’s Champions’
League, abound, and one club after the next becomes listed on a stock ex-
change. Professional soccer clubs such as AC Milan, Ajax, Arsenal, Barcelona,
Bayern Mu¨nchen, Juventus, Manchester United, Olympique Marseille and Real
Madrid are billion-generating ﬁgure heads of their national cultures. No won-
der that government authorities, both nationally and internationally, are inter-
ested in soccer’s well-being. Particularly in Europe, the European Union’s and
the UEFA’s intervention policies are crucial determinants of the fates of clubs
and leagues.
In this paper, we analyze the competitive consequences, in terms of na-
tional competitive balances and international quality diﬀerences, of two such
intervention policies: the changes in European Union’s player transfer rules
(speciﬁcally the foreigner rule and the Bosman ruling, according to which play-
ers from the EU are free agents when their contracts expire) and the intro-
duction of UEFA’s Champions’ League. By studying both regulatory events in
European soccer’s recent history, we hope to gain insight into the likely impact
of future changes in the ‘rules of the game’ on the competitiveness of soccer,
both nationally and internationally.
Although the soccer game has attracted the attention of analytical and em-
pirical economists (see, e.g., Clarke and Norman (1995), Dobson and Goddard
(2001), Koning (2000), and Szymanski and Kuypers (1999)), the study of ‘non-
American’ football is still relatively undeveloped. In eﬀect, the current state of
the art in the economics (and management, for that matter)1 of sports is heav-
ily biased toward the big-four American professional team sports (see, e.g., Fort
and Quirk’s 1995 review article in the Journal of Economic Literature): Ameri-
can football, baseball, basketball and ice hockey. Although these US sports in-
dustries organize ‘World Series’, the national nature of the associated leagues
ignores an issue that is of crucial importance in the context of soccer: cross-
border player trade and international team leagues. So, while beneﬁting from
1There is a large (particularly US) management literature that seeks to deepen our under-
standing of the behavior and performance of sports players or teams. Two illustrative studies
are Straw and Hoang (1995) and Bloom (1999). Clearly, this interesting literature focuses on
lower levels of analysis (the individual player or team) while the current study deals with the
aggregate industry.
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the ‘autarkic’ US literature, we develop an empirical and theoretical analysis of
international sports economics in the setting of European soccer. In this con-
text, as said, this paper focuses on issues of competition. The reason for this
is twofold.
First, the peculiar feature of sports industries in general and soccer leagues
in particular is that competition is their very product. Sports leagues need to
produce ‘competitive excitement’ to survive. Without competitive excitement,
a sports league would be dull: after all, then there is not much that is attrac-
tive to customers (i.e., fans). This is in contrast with non-sports industries. The
sports industries’ uniqueness in the business world as a producer and seller of
competition makes them particularly interesting from an antitrust perspective.
The production of competitive excitement is unlikely to be a sustainable activ-
ity without any cartel-like arrangement at the industry (i.e., league) level. The
industry’s cartel function is to organize a competitive league and to stimulate
competitive balance.
Second, and related to the above, sports industries tend to be associated
with a conﬂict of interest at the policy level. Again, European soccer is an illu-
minating case in point. On the one hand, as explained above, the very ‘prod-
uct’ of soccer is bound up with cartel-like arrangements, implying that the
antitrust authorities must tolerate tailor-made anti-competitive soccer prac-
tices (such as the industry-level sharing rules as to television rights). On the
other hand, much of European soccer’s attractiveness derives from interna-
tional competition among national club teams in UEFA leagues. However, such
European leagues, like their national counterparts, must produce competitive
excitement. This requires establishing and maintaining industry-level mecha-
nisms that help to avoid the emergence of large international quality diﬀer-
ences. In this context, many soccer experts argue that an international player
transfer system that promotes the free movement of soccer players, which
would be in line with the European Union’s integration philosophy, is a death
penalty for many European and national leagues. Hoehn and Szymanski (1999)
argue that “single-league competition for the top clubs is the most plausible
equilibrium for European football.” Moving from the current European system
to a more American structure, they argue, should be beneﬁcial for clubs.
So, issues of national competitive balances and international quality diﬀer-
ences in European soccer are at the very heart of key policy debates in the
European Union and its member states. This paper’s aim is to contribute to
this debate by oﬀering an in-depth analysis of the competitive consequences
of earlier changes in the ‘rules of the game’ in European soccer, which may
be instrumental in understanding what might be the impact of future policy
interventions. Section 2 develops a model of national and international soccer
competition that analyzes the competitive eﬀects of promoting free interna-
tional player trade and introducing a Champions’ League for nationally top-
performing teams. Subsequently, Section 3 explores these issues empirically by
calculating proxies for national competitive balances and international quality
diﬀerences for a number of European countries in the post-war period. Finally,
Section 4 discusses our ﬁndings in relation to the current policy debate.
2 A Theoretical Model
2.1 The European Soccer Market
Sports leagues diﬀer from regular industries. The demand for the product pro-
duced by a sports league industry depends not only on the absolute qualities
provided by the diﬀerent producers, but also on the diﬀerence between those
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qualities. An exciting league, in which qualities of the teams are comparable,
leads to greater fan interest. Fans favor competitive balance, which is asso-
ciated with a not-too-uneven distribution of qualities of teams in a competi-
tion. Discussions about institutional features of international soccer suggest
that fans, teams and policy makers also care about the overall quality level
in a given national league. Therefore, people care not only about intra-league
competitive balance, but also about inter-league competitive balance, or inter-
national quality diﬀerences.2 When international quality diﬀerences increase,
fans in countries with low-quality leagues are (even) worse oﬀ, as their leagues
become less attractive, while fans in high-quality leagues are better oﬀ as their
leagues become more attractive. International competitions, however, become
less exciting.
The European soccer market diﬀers fundamentally from sports markets
in the US. While in the US leagues are (almost) always monopolists, national
leagues compete in the European soccer market. They do so in two ways. First,
the most successful teams in a national league play each other in international
play-oﬀs, such as the Champions’ League or the UEFA cup. Second, national
leagues, or rather teams within national leagues, compete for talent. In many
US leagues, players eﬀectively do not have the possibility to market their talent
outside their own professional monopolistic sports league. European soccer
players do have that possibility: they often move to competing foreign leagues.
This limits the scope for collusion within a national league. Arrangements such
as a salary cap, used in American professional basketball, are hardly viable in
a national soccer league. The model we develop in this section captures these
features of European soccer: the existence of international competitions, and
the possibility for talent to move freely between national competitions.
Our model focuses on two issues: the introduction of the Bosman ruling
and the Champions’ League. First, in the past, clubs have tried to restrict the
possibility of players moving across borders. Yet, with the Bosman ruling in
1995, these barriers have been lowered. Before this ruling, teams could ask
for a transfer fee if a player left the club when his contract expired. After the
ruling, a soccer player from the European Union (EU) is a free agent within the
EU after his contract expires. Moreover, in this ruling it was also determined
that teams within the EU are not subject to any restrictions on the number of
EU-players they can ﬁeld. For more information on the background and impli-
cations of the Bosman ruling we refer to Antonioni and Cubbin (2000). Second,
the UEFA launched a prestigious international competition in 1990. For sure,
international competitions already existed before 1990. However, the interna-
tional prestige and, especially, the amount of money at stake were substantially
lower then.
2.2 The Benchmark Model
Consider a single country that has a soccer league that operates in isolation.
For future reference, we will denote this country as country a.3 Players can-
not be transferred to leagues in other countries. For simplicity, we assume
that there are only two clubs. It is easy to extent the analysis to more clubs,
but for our purposes two clubs suﬃce. We assume that clubs maximize prof-
its. In order to keep the model manageable, we do not consider intertemporal
2For ease of discussion, in the remainder of this paper we will talk about national competitive
balance if we mean intra-league competitive balance, and about international quality diﬀerences
when we refer to inter-league competitive balance.
3Note that, for this subsection, we do not need the country index. We prefer to use it however,
in order to have a consistent notation throughout this section.
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proﬁt maximization, or investment in players and/or facilities. Clubs will thus
hire talent up to the point where the marginal revenues of doing so equal the
marginal costs. The amount of talent in club j in country a is denoted taj.
As a normalization, the total amount of talent in this country equals 1, thus
ta1 + ta2 = 1. Revenues of a club consist of three components. The ﬁrst is
related to the club’s own supporters. These sources of income include gate re-
ceipts, merchandising proﬁt, local television contracts, et cetera. For simplicity,






Here, Daj is a constant that diﬀers among clubs, giving the exogenous drawing
potential of a club. A club’s drawing potential reﬂects the amount of revenues
it can generate with a given amount of talent. This depends, for example, on
the size of the city where a club is located, the popularity of soccer in that
particular city, and the extent to which a club is successful in marketing itself.
Weak-drawing clubs have low D, whereas strong-drawing clubs have high D.
For the purposes of our paper, drawing potential is exogenously given. The
parameter k is some exogenous constant, and does not qualitatively aﬀect the
analysis. We assume k < 2Dij ∀i, j, i.e., gate receipts are globally increasing
in the amount of talent a club has. Note that the above speciﬁcation implies
a linear downward-sloping marginal revenue curve, which is also assumed in,
e.g., Fort and Quirk (1995). Admittedly, our speciﬁcation is highly simpliﬁed.
It could be argued that gate receipts also depend on the amount of talent of
the opposing team, and possibly on the level of competitive balance. Yet, our
speciﬁcation allows for simple analytical solutions, and further complicating
the function above will not aﬀect the gist of the analysis.
The second component of a club’s revenues is the prize money it receives
when winning the league. This amount is exogenously given and equal to Fa.
The third and ﬁnal component is a lump sum based on, e.g., national television
contracts. We do not take this into account in the further analysis. For simplic-
ity, the only costs we consider are the costs of hiring talent. For team j, these
are equal to ctaj, with c the constant per-unit cost of talent, that is, the wage
rate of talent. We assume that the probability that team j wins the league is
given by







with j = 1,2 and where −j denotes the team other than j. With this speci-
ﬁcation, when both teams have the same amount of talent, they both have a
probability 12 of winning. Also, the higher the amount of talent in a team, the
higher its probability of winning the league. If a club has all the talent, then it
wins with certainty. Finally, this speciﬁcation satisﬁes the condition that prob-
abilities should sum to one.












1+ taj − ta−j
)
Fa.
Since any club realizes that adding talent implies that the other club will have







With the price per unit of talent given by c, proﬁts are maximized by setting
marginal revenue equal to c. Therefore, in equilibrium, marginal revenues of
clubs are equal. Hence,
Da1 − 2kta1 + Fa = Da2 − 2kta2 + Fa. (2)
From the above equality, and using ta1 + ta2 = 1, the equilibrium has4







Thus, in equilibrium, the club with higher drawing power attracts more talent.
Without loss of generality, assume that this is club 1, soDa1 ≥ Da2. If we deﬁne
competitive balance as the diﬀerence in winning probabilities, we have




With a competitive labor market, wages will be bid up to the point where clubs’
proﬁts are zero. Thus
c = 1
2
(Da1 +Da2)+ Fa − k. (5)
2.3 Introducing International Trade
Now suppose that international trade in players is possible. We assume that
there are two countries, a and b, which are both endowed with an amount of
talent equal to 1. This may seem at odds with diﬀerences in population size,
but we look at top soccer players, and the distribution of maximum talent
varies slowly with the population size. Initially, there is no trade, so the market
equilibrium is given by (3) through (5). Now markets open up, so talent can
move freely from one country to the other. In Europe, international player trade
has been allowed for a long time, but teams were severely restricted in the
number and type of foreign players they could ﬁeld. Since the Bosman-ruling,
players from the European Union can be ﬁelded with any team from a member
state without restrictions.
Denote the total amount of talent that will end up in country a in equilib-
rium as ta, and that in country b as tb. Thus, ti ≡ ti1 + ti2, with i = a,b. Also,
Di ≡ Di1+Di2, with i = a,b. Total revenues of, for example, team 1 in country
a are now given by
Ra1 = (Da1 − kta1) ta1 + 12 (1+ ta1 − ta2) Fa.
Again, teams realize that the amount of talent their competitor hires, is depen-
dent on the amount of talent they hire: ta2 = 2− tb − ta1. Therefore,
Ra1 = (Da1 − kta1) ta1 + 12 (2ta1 + tb − 1) Fa.
Expressions for the other three clubs are similar. Marginal revenues for club j
in country i now equal
∂Rij
∂tij
= Dij − 2ktij + Fi, (6)
with i = a,b and j = 1,2. In equilibrium, marginal revenues are necessarily
equal for every club, since we now have a single international price for talent.
4Note that, for this solution to make sense, we need k > |Da1 −Da2|.
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Equating the sum of marginal revenues for clubs in country a with that for
clubs in country b, we then have
Da − 2kta + 2Fa = Db − 2ktb + 2Fb. (7)
Moreover, ta + tb = 2. Thus,
ti = 1+ (Di −D−i)+ 2 (Fi − F−i)4k , (8)
where −i denotes the country diﬀerent from i. It seems natural to assume that
the country with the higher drawing power also has the higher prize money:
sgn(Di −D−i) = sgn(Fi − F−i) . The analysis then implies that, if international
trade in players is allowed, talent will move from the weakest to the highest
drawing country.
To determine equilibrium wages, we ﬁrst need the distribution of talent
within a given country. From (6), equating ∂Ri1/∂ti1 with ∂Ri2/∂ti2 implies
Di1 − 2kti1 = Di2 − 2kti2.
Using (8) and ti1 + ti2 = 1, we have
tij = 12 +
3Dij −Di−j −D−i + 2 (Fi − F−i)
8k
. (9)
With Di1 ≥ Di2, competitive balance in country i then equals
cbi = Di1 −Di22k . (10)
Comparing this with (4), we see that competitive balance within a country does
not change when international trade in players is allowed. That balance only
depends on the relative drawing powers of domestic clubs, and is not aﬀected
by the extent to which talent ﬂows to or from a particular country.
With a competitive labor market, wages are
c = Da1 − 2kta1 + Fa
= Da +Db + 2 (Fa + Fb)
4
− k. (11)
From (5), this is equal to the average wage in the two countries before interna-
tional trade was allowed. Allowing clubs to freely ﬁeld foreigners will therefore
not aﬀect total wages. Wages in the weak-drawing country will go up, while
wages in the strong-drawing league will go down, relative to a situation of au-
tarky. Also, from the discussion of (8), teams in the strong-drawing country
will now be stronger, and teams in the weak-drawing countries will be weaker.
Thus, international quality diﬀerences increase. Yet, as said, competitive bal-
ance within a national competition is not aﬀected.
2.4 Introducing a Champions’ League
We now study the eﬀects of the introduction in the benchmark model of a
Champions’ League: an international competition that ﬁelds the best teams of
both national competitions against each other. A full analysis would require
a two-period model: ﬁrst, teams have some probability of reaching the Cham-
pions’ League and, second, given that they do, they have some probability of
winning it. We simplify by collapsing this into one stage by assuming that each
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team has some probability of winning the Champions’ League that directly de-
pends on the amount of talent the particular team has. We choose a speciﬁca-
tion that has the same properties as (1). That is, we require that the probability
of winning the Champions’ League increases in the amount of talent a team
has; that the probabilities of winning are equal when clubs have equal talent;
and that a club that owns all talent wins with certainty. This implies that for
team j in country i, the probability of winning the Champions’ League is







where t¯−ij denotes the average amount of talent of the other three teams.
We assume that winning the Champions’ League yields prize money FC.5
The extra matches played also yield extra gate receipts. We assume that these
equal
Gi = γ (Di − kti) ti,
with γ ≥ 0. This is a ﬂexible speciﬁcation: if all the receipts of the Champions’
League go to the organizing body, we have γ = 0. If the team can keep all the
receipts to itself, we probably have that gate receipts from Champions’ League
matches outweigh those of regular competition matches, implying γ > 1. Total
receipts of, say, team 1 in country a are
Ra1 = (1+ γ) (Da1 − kta1) ta1 + 12 (1+ ta1 − ta2) Fa
+1
8
(2+ 3ta1 − ta2 − tb1 − tb2) FC. (13)
Without international trade, total talent in each country equals 1. Thus
Ra1 = (1+ γ) (Da1 − kta1) ta1 + ta1Fa + 12ta1FC.
Marginal revenues thus equal
∂Ra1
∂ta1
= (1+ γ) (Da1 − 2kta1)+ Fa + 12FC,
with similar expressions for the other teams.
Within each country, marginal revenues are equal. Hence,
Da1 − 2kta1 = Da2 − 2kta2,
and we are back to the same case as in (2). The equilibrium distribution of
talent is therefore given by (3). With a competitive labor market,
c = (1+ γ) (Da1 − 2kta1)+ Fa + 12FC
= 1
2
(1+ γ) (Da − 2k)+ Fa + 12FC.
Comparing this to (5), it is obvious that wages have increased. Thus, the estab-
lishment of an international competition in the absence of cross-border trade
in talent will not aﬀect competitive balance within a national competition. Obvi-
ously, international quality diﬀerences are also unaﬀected, since talent cannot
move between countries.
5In practice, reaching the Champions’ League but failing to win it, still implies substantial
revenues. In our simpliﬁed model, we also abstract from that.
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2.5 Introducing a Champions’ League and International Trade
Now suppose there is a Champions’ League, and international trade in players
is allowed. Again, total revenues for club 1 in country a are given by (13). Yet,
now the only restriction on the distribution of talent is that the total amount of
international talent equals the available stock of talent: ta1+ta2+tb1+tb2 = 2.
Thus,




Marginal revenues for this team now are
∂Ra1
∂ta1
= (1+ γ) (Da1 − 2kta1)+ Fa + 12FC,
with similar expressions for the other teams. In equilibrium, marginal revenues
are necessarily equal for each club. Equating the sum of marginal revenues for
clubs in country a with that for clubs in country b then implies
(1+ γ) (Da − 2kta)+ 2Fa + FC = (1+ γ) (Db − 2ktb)+ 2Fb + FC.
With ta + tb = 2, this yields
ti = 1+ Di −D−i4k +
Fi − F−i
2k (1+ γ). (14)
Note that, compared to (8), the Champions’ League reduces the amount of tal-
ent that will end up in the strong-drawing country. The intuition behind this re-
sult is the following. By reaching the Champions’ League, teams can earn more
money, due to the fact that gate receipts will increase (as may prize money).
Yet, these higher receipts are relatively more important for teams from weak-
drawing countries, since their revenues from the national league are lower.
As the incentives of teams have become more aligned, their quality diﬀer-
ences will decrease. This is a general mechanism, also noted by Szymanski
(2001b: F71/F72), albeit in a diﬀerent context. Therefore, with the introduction
of a Champions’ League, the incentive of these teams to attract more talent
increases more.
To see what happens to national competitive balance, equating ∂Ri1/∂ti1
with ∂Ri2/∂ti2 yields
Di1 − 2kti1 = Di2 − 2kti2.
Using (14), this implies
tij = 12 +
3Dij −Di,−j −D−i
8k
+ (Fi − F−i)
(1+ γ)4k.
Hence, retaining the assumption that Di1 ≥ Di2,
cbi = ti1 − ti2 = Di1 −Di22k .
Again, competitive balance within a competition has not changed.
2.6 Empirical predictions
In Europe, we virtually had a situation with no Champions’ League and no
Bosman ruling. Then, the Champions’ League was established in 1990. After
that, in 1995, the Bosman ruling came into eﬀect. In terms of our model we thus
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started with the situation described in subsection 2.2, and then moved to the
situation described in subsection 2.4. Now, we have the situation described in
subsection 2.5. Comparing the expressions for international quality diﬀerences




Champions’ League No eﬀect No eﬀect No eﬀect
Bosman-ruling Quality increases Quality decreases No eﬀect
Table 1: Empirical predictions from the theoretical analysis
The theoretical model suggests ﬁve hypotheses which indicate that (1) the
introduction of the Champions’ League has no eﬀect on international quality
diﬀerences (Hypothesis 1) and no eﬀect on national competitive balances (Hy-
pothesis 2) and (2) the free movement of soccer players increases the quality
of clubs from strong-drawing countries (Hypothesis 3), decreases the quality
of teams from weak-drawing countries (Hypothesis 4) and leaves the national
competitive balances unaﬀected (Hypothesis 5).
The model is informative about two additional issues. First, the model pro-
duces clear predictions about the impact of both types of measures upon
player wages, too. However, regrettably, lack of data implies that we cannot test
this part of the model’s predictions. Second, a remark must be made about the
order of institutional events in European soccer of the 1990s. Our hypotheses
in Table 1 focus on the main eﬀect of either the establishment of the Champi-
ons’ League or the introduction of the Bosman ruling. However, as the Champi-
ons’ League was introduced in 1990 and as the Bosman ruling came into eﬀect
in 1995, our natural experiment cannot reveal the model condition where only
the free transfer of talent applies. The model in subsection 2.5–with a free
movement of talent and the establishment of a Champions’ League–suggests
that international quality diﬀerences may decrease as the marginal revenue
from both institutional changes in interaction is larger for clubs from weak-
drawing countries than for their counterparts from strong-drawing leagues.
We return to this issue below when introducing our econometric model speci-
ﬁcation.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data, Measures, and Methodologies
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on a dataset of soccer results in
seven major competitions in Belgium, England, France, Germany (West-Germany
before the uniﬁcation), Italy, The Netherlands, and Spain, as summarized in
Table 2. Professional soccer started at diﬀerent dates in these countries. For
the empirical analysis we only used data for seasons after 1945/46. Besides
data on national competitions, we have also collected data on the results in
all European tournaments (European Cup I, European Cup II, UEFA Cup, and
Champions’ League) from 1980/81 to 1999/00. This dataset comprises 2847
encounters. Most encounters consist of two games, one home game for either
team. During this time period, teams from 51 diﬀerent countries participated
in these European tournaments.
National competitive balance is measured as the distribution of qualities of
9






The Netherlands 1956/57-1999/00 13200
Spain 1928/29-1999/00 17746
Table 2: Data on national competitions.
soccer teams in a competition. A competition is in perfect balance if the prob-
ability that a team wins from an opponent is independent of that opponent
(Koning (2000)). The quality of teams is measured by the model
GDij = hi + θi − θj + ij, (15)
with GDij the goals diﬀerence in a game between i (which plays home) and j
(which plays away), hi the home advantage of team i, θi the quality of team i,
θj the quality of team j, and ij a random error term that captures all deter-
minants of the outcome that are not due to either home advantage or quality
diﬀerence (e.g., injuries, fatigue due to an international game a few days earlier,
et cetera). This parsimonious model of soccer results is known to have reason-
able predictive ability. If there would be no home advantage, goals diﬀerence
in model (15) is determined solely by the diﬀerence in θ’s. Hence we inter-
pret these parameters as quality measurements (see also Clarke and Norman
(1995)). Of course, one can argue that quality of a team can also be measured
by the wage bill of the team. We are not able to pursue this idea any further
because detailed ﬁnancial data on soccer teams are not available. The quality
parameter θ refers to the quality displayed in a national competition only. The
variation of the quality parameters θ provides a measure of competitive bal-
ance: if each team would be equally good, the θ’s would be 0 and hence the
spread of the θ’s would be 0. Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we
estimate equation (15) as an ordered probit model with ‘home loss’, ‘draw’, and
‘home win’ as the dependent variable (see also Koning (2000)).
Another measure of concentration of quality in professional soccer is the
concentration ratio (Koning (2000)). This ratio is calculated as the number of
points of the best k teams divided by the maximum number of points these




Wk(2N − k− 1) , (16)
with P(i) the number of points obtained by the ith best team, W the number of
points per game won (which is 3 in modern soccer), and N the number of teams
in the competition. The ratio is 1 for the k best teams if each of these team wins
all games against teams that are lower in the ranking. Roughly speaking, CRk is
the share the k best teams obtained from the maximum number of points they
could have obtained. CRk is an interesting measure of balance in a competition
because it is believed that recently the top teams have improved so much over
the lesser teams (for example, because of Champions’ League revenues and
because of better sponsor contracts) that they form a league of their own.
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Alternatively, the dynamics in national soccer markets can be assessed by
looking at variation of the year-to-year ranking. Year-to-year variation in rank-
ing can be measured by calculating the number of changes in the ranking. Let
rkt be the ranking of team k in year t, so that rkt = 1 for the team winning the




|rkt − rkt−1|. (17)
Note that this measure treats moves up and down identically. Of course, DNt
depends on the number of teams in a competition. If a league consists of two
teams, DNt is either 0 or 2, in a league of three teams DNt is either 0, 2, or
4, et cetera. If a league has an even number of teams, the maximum of DNt
is 12n







|rkt − rkt−1|. (18)
It is more diﬃcult to measure team quality and developments in team qual-
ity in an international context (like European competitions) than in a national
setting. More than 600 teams have participated in the European tournaments
during the last 20 seasons, which makes estimation of a model similar to
model (15) infeasible. However, many soccer fans associate themselves with
teams from their country, and hence the performance of individual teams in
European soccer tournaments is not the only interesting measure of interna-
tional success. Because of these considerations, we measure performance in
international tournaments countrywise. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a measure
ψc as the number of games played by all teams from country c divided by
twice the total number of games played in all European tournaments. This
measure can be interpreted as the share of the pie that consists of all team
slots in games in European competitions during a season occupied by teams
of country c. For example, during the 1999/2000 season, Dutch teams played
38 games in European tournaments. Since in total 362 games were played that
season, the international quality measure of Dutch soccer is 0.0525.
3.2 National Competitive Balance
The development of the variance of the estimated θ’s over time for our seven
diﬀerent countries is graphically depicted in Figure 1. If quality diﬀerences
between teams in a national competition would have increased over time, the
lines in Figure 1 should be sloping upward. If anything, the long-term trends in
Figure 1 are sloping downward, suggesting an increase of national competitive
balances over time. In Figure 1 and later ﬁgures we aid the interpretation by
drawing a line which is a local regression of the variable graphed on time (see
for example Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001)).
The development of the coeﬃcient of determination of model (15) over time
is found in Figure 6 in the Appendix. From the standard F -test on signiﬁcance
of a regression for each country, we ﬁnd that R2 deviates signiﬁcantly from
0 for all countries for all seasons. Hence, the parameters θi and hi jointly
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 0. In Germany and Spain the competition has become
less predictable over time as judged by the decrease of R2 over time in these
countries. Still, typical values of R2 in recent seasons for these countries are
in the 0.28− 0.32 range. The average value of R2 for The Netherlands is 0.40.
So 40% of the variation in goal diﬀerence in the Dutch soccer league can be
explained by a model as simple as (15).
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Figure 1: Variation of quality over time.
It appears from Figure 2 that the concentration ratio (16) has not changed
much over time in the countries we examine. The variation of CR4 from year
to year is of much larger magnitude than any trend that can be discerned. But
the concentration ratio pertains to the strength of the top four teams; it does
not look at the identity of those teams. Do the same teams compete for the
championship each year, or do the identities of the best teams change? This
issue is addressed in Table 3, where we give (for each country) the number of
teams that have made up the top four in the end-of-season ranking, and the
four teams that have appeared in the top four of the ranking most often. So
for The Netherlands we see that 22 diﬀerent teams have had a ranking in the
top four during any season between 1955/56 and 1999/2000. The teams with
most appearances in the top four are: Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV and Twente. Ajax
has ended the competition in the top four 88.6% of all seasons, Feyenoord in
81.8%, et cetera. In Table 3 we see noticeable diﬀerences between countries.
In The Netherlands there are three teams that make up the top, in Spain two
teams, and in Belgium and Germany there is one team that has been consis-
tently at the top. In England and France, though, the teams that ended in the
top four most often (Manchester United and Monaco, respectively), ﬁnished the
season more frequently outside of the top four than in the top four. Moreover,
it should be noted that in Belgium and England there are many more teams that
have ended in the top ranking at some moment in time than in Germany, Italy,
and The Netherlands. Apparently, the pool of potential national top teams is
larger in Belgium and England than in the other countries. We conclude from
Table 3 that the top is most concentrated in The Netherlands, followed by Italy
and Spain. However, from Figure 2 it is clear that the quality diﬀerence of these
teams with those that are ranked lower has not increased over time. The con-
centration at the end of the nineties is not diﬀerent from the concentration
12














Figure 2: Concentration ratio CR4 over time.
during the early seventies.
In Figure 3 we graph the development of year-to-year change of ranking
DN∗t in the seven leagues we analyze in this paper. From the smooth curves in
the plots we see that there are no long-term trends: it is not the case that fewer
teams change places at the end of the sample period than at the beginning
of the sample period. However, there is clearly year-to-year variation. In some
seasons teams change only a few places; in other seasons they change more
places in the ﬁnal ranking.
3.3 International Quality Differences
The development of international quality over time is drawn in Figure 4. En-
glish teams were banned from participating in European competitions from
1985/86 to 1989/90 because of fan riots in May 1985. Therefore,ψEng is 0 for
these seasons. Again, to aid in determining long-term patterns we have drawn
a regression line in the panels of Figure 4. The pattern that emerges from Fig-
ure 4 is interesting: the international success of England, Italy, and Spain has
increased clearly over time. The Netherlands, France, and Turkey have gained
some success in European international soccer since the early eighties. Other
countries either have not changed their position in the European pecking or-
der, or they have declined as is the case most notably with Germany. Interna-
tional success by teams of the former Soviet Union (and its successors) has not
changed by much over time, but the qualities of teams from other countries
from Eastern Europe have deteriorated. Undoubtedly, that reﬂects the opening
of the borders for citizens of these countries and the economic problems in
Eastern Europe.
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Country Number Best four teams
of teams
Belgium 34 Anderlecht (90.9%), Standard Luik (56.4%)
Club Brugge (50.9%), FC Antwerp (25.5%)
England 34 Manchester United (45.5%), Liverpool (45.5%)
Arsenal (30.3%), Wolverhampton
Wanderers (24.2%)
France 27 Monaco (41.8%), St. Etienne (38.2%)
Bordeaux (38.2%), Olympique Marseille (36.4%)
Germany 21 Bayern Mu¨nchen (75.7%)
Borussia Mo¨nchengladbach (37.8%)
Werder Bremen (35.1%), Vfb Stuttgart (32.4%)
Italy 20 Juventus (78.2%), AC Milan (69.0%)
Internazionale (67.3%), Fiorentina (34.5%)
Netherlands 22 Ajax (88.6%), Feyenoord (81.8%)
PSV (77.3%), Twente (27.3%)
Spain 19 FC Barcelona (89.1%), Real Madrid (83.6%)
Atletico Madrid (54.5%), Valencia (41.8%)
Table 3: Teams with most rankings in the top four (1945/46-1999/2000).





















Figure 3: Dynamics of position.
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Figure 4: International quality over time (continued).





















Figure 4: International quality over time.
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3.4 Statistical Tests
The graphical analysis suggests that competitive balance in national compe-
titions has not been subject to many changes, while international quality dif-
ferences may have changed over time. In this subsection we will test these
hypotheses formally, with reference to the introduction of the Champions’
League and the Bosman ruling (cf. Table 1), so that we distinguish between
diﬀerences in means of our variables of interest and sample variation.
First, we consider the eﬀect of the introduction of the Champions’ League
and the Bosman-ruling on national competitive balance. We let yit be the de-
pendent variable in country i in year t. According to our theoretical discussion,
we need to distinguish between weak-drawing and strong-drawing countries.
Therefore, let Di be an indicator of drawing power (1 for strong-drawing coun-
tries and 0 for weak-drawing countries). The time dummies CLt and Bt indicate
whether or not an observation is from after the introduction of the Champions’
League or the Bosman-ruling, respectively. The model we estimate is
yit = αi + β1DiCLt + β2(1−Di)CLt + γ1DiBt + γ2(1−Di)Bt + εit. (19)
This model assigns a diﬀerent mean level of national competitive balance to
each country, and that mean level may have changed after the introduction
of the Champions’ League or the Bosman-ruling. The ﬁxed eﬀects αi mea-
sure the structure of the soccer market in each country, its competitiveness,
the size of the market in a country, and all other factors that vary between
countries and determine national competitive balance. The eﬀect of the intro-
duction of the Champions’ League (CL-eﬀect) on competitive balance is β1 for
strong-drawing countries and β2 for weak-drawing countries. The eﬀect of the
Bosman-ruling for strong-drawing countries is γ1, and the eﬀect on national
competitive balance in weak-drawing countries is γ2. Note that our model spec-
iﬁcation model (19), together with the order of intervention events, is associ-
ated with an identiﬁcation problem. That is, the main eﬀect of the introduction
of the Bosman ruling (introduced in 1995, as reﬂected in γ1 an γ2) cannot be
estimated without the interaction with the co-existing Champions’ League (es-
tablished in 1990, its main eﬀect being associated with β1 and β2). Adding a
CLt · Bt interaction term would not help at all, as then the main eﬀect can-
not be distinguished properly from the interaction one. Given this unsolvable
identiﬁcation problem, we decided to concentrate on the main eﬀects only.
We estimate model (19) for each of the seven countries, for the period
1980/81 to 1999/2000. England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are consid-
ered to be strong-drawing countries because of the size of the market in these
countries, whereas Belgium and The Netherlands are coded as weak-drawing
countries.6 This division corresponds to the size of the population in these
countries. According to the theoretical model discussed earlier (cf. Table 1),
national competitive balance is expected to be unaﬀected by the introduction
of the Champions’ League and the Bosman-ruling, so we do not expect that the
coeﬃcients β1, β2, γ1, and γ2 diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 0.
In Table 4 we see that the eﬀects of the introduction of the Champions’
League and the Bosman ruling on the static measure of national competitive
balance (σθ) is marginally signiﬁcant. The hypothesis of no eﬀect is rejected
at a level of signiﬁcance of 5%, but not at a level of signiﬁcance of 1%. The
dynamic measure of national competitive balance (DN) has not been aﬀected
by the introduction of the Champions’ League. Similar results are found if the
concentration ratio is used as the dependend variable in regression (19).
6Similar results are found when France and/or Germany are considered to be weak-drawing




no CL-eﬀect, no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.0244
no CL-eﬀect 0.0328
no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.360
DN
no CL-eﬀect, no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.663
no CL-eﬀect 0.377
no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.872
ψ
no CL-eﬀect, no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.000
no CL-eﬀect 0.651
no Bosman-ruling eﬀect 0.001
Table 4: Tests of signiﬁcance of eﬀect of Champions’ League and Bosman-
ruling.






Table 5: Point estimates of Champions’ League eﬀect and Bosman-ruling eﬀect
on international success (∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level).
According to our theoretical model, we expect that international quality dif-
ferences (ψ) do not depend on the introduction of the Champions’ League but
are aﬀected by the Bosman-ruling. This is conﬁrmed in Table 4: the Bosman
ruling has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on international success of countries, but
the introduction of the Champions’ League has had no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Point estimates are given in Table 5. The estimates of β1 and β2 do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from 0, so we may conclude that international success
has not been aﬀected by the introduction of the Champions’ League (this hy-
pothesis is not rejected at the usual level of signiﬁcance: see Table 4). The
eﬀect of the Bosman-ruling is signiﬁcant: strong-drawing countries have be-
come stronger, and weak-drawing countries have become weaker. This eﬀect
is strongly signiﬁcant. Moreover, the size of the Bosman-ruling eﬀect is larger
than the (insigniﬁcant) size of the Champions’ League eﬀect.
By and large, the statistical tests conﬁrm our visual inspection of the graphs
in the previous subsections. National competitive balance, as measured either
by the standard deviation of the quality of soccer teams or by the dynamics of
position, has been aﬀected very little by either the introduction of the Cham-
pions’ League or the Bosman-ruling. International success, on the other hand,
has been aﬀected signiﬁcantly by the Bosman-ruling: strong-drawing countries
have become more successful and weak-drawing countries have become less
successful. This is evidence in favor of our theoretical model in section 2.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the eﬀects of recent changes in the (interna-
tional) institutional setting of European soccer on both national competitive
balances and international quality diﬀerences. Our main conclusions are that
national competitive balances have not changed over time, despite the intro-
duction of the Champions’ League and the Bosman-ruling, whereas interna-
tional quality diﬀerences have increased, particularly as a result of the Bosman
ruling. These results have been derived in a theoretical model and have, by and
large, been conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence. From this overall pattern of
results, by way of appraisal, we may speculate about the likely consequences
of future changes in European soccer’s institutional setting, which helps to
identify a number of interesting avenues for future research.
First, in the autum of 2001, after long negotiations, the European Union has
announced to agree with UEFA plans to reform the player transfer system such
that fees for young players are permitted. The argument is that this is a fair
way to compensate for the clubs’ investment in the education and training of
youth players. Clearly, the proposed transfer system reform implies a partial
de-liberalization of the labor market for soccer talent. From the perspective of
this paper’s model and evidence, after reversing the argument, we can predict
that this is likely to decrease international quality diﬀerences (reversed Hy-
potheses 3 and 4), to the beneﬁt of weak-drawing countries, without aﬀecting
national competitive balance (Hypothesis 5). Empirically, we may estimate the
consequences of the transfer system reform later in this decade. Theoretically,
future research may be directed at ﬁnetuning our model of international soc-
cer competition by introducing a dual labor market, distinguishing segments
for young versus not-so-young players.
Second, there are talks about the establishment of a new international league—
the Euro League—among top clubs from weak-drawing countries such as Aus-
tria, Belgium, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden as a
response to the claimed increase in international quality diﬀerences in the
nineties. As yet, the response from the UEFA to this idea has not been fa-
vorable. However, this paper’s model and evidence (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 2)
suggest that the introduction of such an Euro League per se is unlikely to aﬀect
the participating clubs’ average international quality. In interaction with the
Bosman ruling, though, the establishment of such an Euro League may well re-
duce international quality diﬀerences (cf. the model in subsection 2.5), so clos-
ing (part of) the gap with the current strong-drawing countries, without having
any eﬀect on national competitive balance (Hypothesis 5). The reason for this
is that by joining forces the top-performing clubs from the weak-drawing coun-
tries may prove to be able to create a strong-drawing league of their own. This,
in turn, improves their position on the market for soccer talent. This is clearly
in the interest of the UEFA. After all, international soccer leagues will loose
much of their appeal as a result of the erosion of the competitive excitement
that comes with increasing international quality diﬀerences. Future research
may focus on answering the question as to what happens if, in line with their
current intentions, the top clubs do leave their national leagues by developing
a model that includes entry into and exit from competing leagues.
The results in our paper can be extended to other European sports markets,
like the ones for basketball, rugby, and volleyball. The deﬁning characteristic
of a sports market is that it ‘sells’ competition. Fans identify themselves with
a team, which is less so in other markets with rare talents (like art or mu-
sic). Moreover, in European soccer, teams compete in two markets: a national
market and an international market. Hence, the consequences of any measure
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to enhance competition need to be assessed in both markets. Our theoretical
and empirical analyses indicate that national competitive balances have been
remarkably robust over time, despite the institutional changes. On the other
hand, we found that international balance has changed over time: the stronger
countries have become more successful in European tournaments at the ex-
pense of weaker countries. Two recent initiatives—the proposed transfer sys-
tem reform and the Euro League establishment—may help to counteract the
historical trend toward divergence in the European soccer arena.
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Appendix
In this appendix we provide additional ﬁgures on the estimation results of
model (15). In Figure 5 we graph the variance of home advantage for diﬀerent
countries, and in Figure 6 we show the how the coeﬃcient of determination
varies over time.
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Figure 5: Variation of home advantage over time.














Figure 6: R2 of model (15) over time.
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